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  E & R Erectors, Inc. ("E & R") has petitioned this 
court for review of two citations and the accompanying penalty 
imposed upon it by the Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission ("Commission").  E & R argues that the Administrative 
Law Judge ("ALJ") erred in finding that E & R was the responsible 
employer on the worksite when the alleged violations occurred and 
also erred in finding that there was sufficient evidence to show 
that these violations did in fact occur.  Equally important is 
the legal question raised by the Petitioner as to who bears the 
burden of proof when an employer claims that compliance with an 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") regulation 
would create a greater hazard that would excuse non-compliance.  
The ALJ's decision ultimately became the final order of the 
Commission.  We perceive no merit to E & R's numerous contentions 
and, therefore, deny the Petition for Review. 
 
 I. 
  On December 1, 1994, OSHA compliance officer George 
Boyd inspected a construction worksite in West Conshohocken, 
Pennsylvania, where a seven-story office building was being 
erected.  The first three levels of the building were to serve as 
a parking garage; the four highest levels were designed for 
office space.  At the time of Boyd's inspection, four levels had 
been constructed: the lowest three levels for parking and the 
first office level (labeled B-1 in the blueprints). 
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  Immediately upon entering the site, Boyd observed that 
the area surrounding the counterweight of a large crane had not 
been barricaded or flagged off, as is required by federal 
regulations.1  At the same time, Boyd saw an employee standing in 
the counterweight's swing area.  Boyd videotaped the area and 
then introduced himself to the two employees operating the crane. 
 One of the crane operators identified himself as an employee of 
E & R.  Boyd told them that the area surrounding the crane's 
counterweight had to be barricaded according to federal 
regulations.  The employees immediately put up flagging around 
the area. 
  Boyd then proceeded to the construction building and 
spoke with Fred Little, the superintendent on the job site for 
the general contractor, John McQuade Construction.  Little told 
Boyd that the ironworkers on the site were employees of E & R.  
Following this conversation, Boyd went to the B-1 level of the 
building and spoke with two of the ironworkers working on this 
level.  They introduced him to their foreman, who identified 
himself as Mr. Brown, an employee of E & R.  The foreman also 
gave Boyd the address and telephone number of E & R Erectors, and 
told Boyd that E & R employed an aggregate of 40 persons. 
                     
1.  29 C.F.R. § 1926.550(a)(9) states that:  "Accessible areas within the swing radius of the 
rear of the rotating superstructure of the crane, either permanently or temporarily mounted, shall 
be barricaded in such a manner as to prevent an employee from being struck or crushed by the 
crane." 
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  Boyd found that the ironworkers were installing large 
steel columns on the B-1 level of the building, and the 
installation process required that they stand near the edge of 
the open-sided floor on that level while guiding the columns into 
place.  Temporary guardrails had been constructed around the 
perimeter of the level; these guardrails had been removed in the 
area of the southeast corner of the structure for installation of 
the columns.  The ironworkers told Boyd that they didn't use any 
fall protection while installing the columns.2    Boyd 
estimated the distance from the B-1 level to the ground to be 
between 29 and 33 feet; E & R insisted that the distance was only 
24 feet.  Federal regulations require that fall protection be 
provided if the distance is greater than 25 feet.3  Therefore, 
Boyd determined that E & R was in violation of these safety 
regulations and that a citation should be issued for this 
violation. 
  On December 6, 1994, Boyd returned to the construction 
site and witnessed a man walking through the area which had been 
flagged off for the crane's counterweight swing radius.  This man 
introduced himself to Boyd as Walter Cantley, and informed Boyd 
that he was E & R's superintendent.  Cantley was also present at 
                     
2.  While Boyd videotaped the installation of some columns at the worksite, he did not 
videotape the installation of the beams for which the citation was issued. 
3.  29 C.F.R. § 1926.105(a) states: "Safety lines shall be provided when workplaces are more 
than 25 feet above the ground or water surface, or other surfaces where the use of ladders, 
scaffolds, catch platforms, temporary floors, safety lines or safety belts is impractical." 
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the closing conference held that day regarding the violations of 
federal safety regulations. 
  OSHA formally cited E & R on December 22, 1994, for 
three violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. ("OSH Act") and its accompanying 
regulations.  The citation for one violation was subsequently 
withdrawn.      E & R contested the two remaining citations and a 
Commission ALJ held a hearing in September, 1995. 
  The ALJ found that E & R was the responsible employer 
at the site at the time of the violations and that sufficient 
proof of the two violations had been established.  Therefore, the 
ALJ affirmed both the citations and the proposed penalty (a $ 
3,000 fine).       E & R petitioned the full Commission for 
discretionary review of the ALJ's order.  The Commission denied 
review, and the ALJ's ruling became the final order of the 
Commission, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 661(j). 
 
 II.  
  The Commission had jurisdiction to adjudicate this 
matter pursuant to § 10(c) of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. § 659(c).  
This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 29 
U.S.C. § 660(a), which gives the circuit in which the violation 
occurred jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the final order of 
the Commission. 
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  Under the OSH Act, the findings of the Commission with 
respect to questions of fact shall be conclusive if supported by 
substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.  29 
U.S.C. § 660(a); Martin v. Bally's Park Place Hotel & Casino, 983 
F.2d 1252, 1256 (3d Cir. 1993).  Legal conclusions may be set 
aside if they are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or otherwise not in accordance with the law.  Atlantic & Gulf 
Stevedores, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 
534 F.2d 541, 547 (3d Cir. 1976); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).  The 
Secretary's reasonable legal interpretation of the OSH Act, a 
statute the Secretary is charged with administering, is entitled 
to deference.  Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 150 (1991).  In light of the OSH Act's 
broad remedial purpose, the Act and regulations issued pursuant 
to it should be liberally construed so as to afford the broadest 
possible protection to workers.  Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 
U.S. 1, 12-13 (1980). 
 
 A. 
  E & R first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 
upon which the ALJ relied in concluding that E & R was on the 
worksite and employed the ironworkers charged with these 
violations.  E & R asserts that the ALJ credited hearsay 
testimony over direct testimonial and documentary evidence, and 
that the ALJ erred in so doing.  The ALJ, however, is entitled to 
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consider all admissible evidence in reaching his factual 
determination, and this finding will be sustained if there is 
substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support it. 
  E & R first asserts that OSHA failed to verify the 
identity of the ironworkers on the worksite and that it therefore 
has not satisfied its burden on this issue.  The only evidence 
presented by the Secretary of Labor was the testimony of the OSHA 
compliance officer, George Boyd.  Boyd testified that he inquired 
who employed the ironworkers to determine the identity of the 
responsible employer.  Fred Little, the general contractor's 
superintendent, and Brown, the foreman of the ironworkers, both 
informed him that the ironworkers were employed by E & R 
Erectors.  Additionally, Boyd testified that he spoke to Walter 
Cantley, E & R's superintendent, at the job site on December 6, a 
few days after the alleged violations, and that Cantley was 
present at the conference later that day relating to the 
violations.  E & R is correct when it contends that this 
testimony was hearsay evidence.  However, E & R failed to object 
to this evidence at the administrative hearing and it was 
therefore admissible as evidence.  United States v. Diaz, 223 
U.S. 442, 450 (1911) ("[W]hen [hearsay evidence] is admitted 
without objection it is to be considered and given its natural 
probative effect as if it were in law admissible"); Wigmore on 
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Evidence § 18 n.1 (1983).4  Thus, this evidence has whatever 
probative value that the ALJ, as the trier of fact in this 
proceeding, reasonably accorded it. 
  E & R responded to Boyd's testimony with three pieces 
of evidence: payroll records, the subcontracting agreement, and 
the testimony of Eugene Grossi, E & R's vice-president.  As to 
the testimony of Grossi, it was within the discretion of the ALJ 
to determine how much weight should be given to the witness' 
testimony, particularly in light of Grossi's admission that he 
was not involved in the day-to-day operations of the company.  
Therefore, Grossi's statement that E & R was not on the worksite 
could properly have been considered less probative than the 
statements of the general contractor's superintendent and the 
ironworkers' foreman. 
  The payroll records for the week of the alleged 
violation show that none of the employees named by Boyd are 
listed on E & R's payroll for New Jersey.  Therefore, an employee 
who was working in Pennsylvania, as was the case here, would not 
be included in these records.  Thus, these records provide only 
marginal evidence, if any, of E & R's assertion that these 
ironworkers were not E & R employees.  The subcontracting 
                     
4.  In his decision, the ALJ stated that the hearsay evidence was admissible under Federal Rule 
of Evidence Rules 801(d)(2)(D) (statements of party-opponent) and 803(1) (present sense 
impression).  E & R Erectors argues that the ALJ erred in these evidentiary rulings.  However, E 
& R did not object to these statements as hearsay at the hearing and therefore cannot now object 
to the admission of this evidence.  
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agreement states that the contract was awarded to Samuel Grossi 
and Sons, Inc., of which Eugene Grossi was company president and 
his brother vice-president, and had been subcontracted to 
Bensalem Steel, owned by Grossi's son and niece.  Along with 
corporate officers, these two companies share a common address 
and telephone number with E & R Erectors.  Given the almost 
transparent interplay of the companies involved in this matter, 
the ALJ reasonably determined and found that the subcontract 
would not outweigh the testimony of the OSHA compliance officer. 
  The ALJ fairly weighed the evidence presented by E & R 
against Boyd's testimony.  His determination that E & R was the 
employer of the ironworkers on the jobsite at the time of the 
violation was supported by the testimony of Boyd, the OSHA 
compliance officer.  E & R's evidence was not conclusive on this 
matter and does not compel a decision different than that reached 
by the ALJ.  Therefore, the ALJ's determination that E & R 
Erectors was the responsible employer on the job site is 
supported by the record and therefore will be regarded as 
conclusive for the purposes of this review.  
  On the matter of who operated the crane, which provided 
the basis for the second violation, Boyd testified that crane was 
a Hawthorne crane and that the operator told him he was an E & R 
employee.  E & R dismisses this testimony as hearsay, although 
they did not challenge the evidence as such at the administrative 
hearing.  To prove that the operator was not an E & R employee, 
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Grossi testified that he was told that the crane belonged to the 
Hawthrone Company and that it was being operated by Hawthorne 
employees.  This testimony was objected to by the Government as 
hearsay and this objection was sustained. 
  E & R has failed to present any documentary evidence 
establishing that the crane was owned/supplied by Hawthorne, much 
less that Hawthorne employees operated the crane.  The only 
evidence it presented as to identity, Grossi's testimony, was 
objected to and sustained.  Thus, the only evidence before the 
ALJ on the matter of the operator's identity was Boyd's hearsay 
testimony.  Therefore, there is sufficient evidence on the record 
to sustain the ALJ's finding that E & R was the responsible 
employer for purposes of the violation of § 1926.550(a).  The 
ALJ's finding that E & R was the responsible employer on the 
worksite for purposes of the violations will be sustained. 
 
 B. 
  29 C.F.R. § 1926.105(a) requires that fall protection 
measures be used when employees are working more than 25 feet 
above the ground.  E & R asserts that the ironworkers were only 
24 feet above the ground at the time of the alleged violation, 
and therefore no violation of § 1926.105(a) actually occurred.  
The ALJ found that the distance from level B-1 to the ground was 
at least 25.5 feet, and affirmed the citation for this violation. 
  
 
 11 
 This factual finding is conclusive if it is supported by 
substantial evidence on the record. 
  In his decision, the ALJ referred to the blueprints for 
the building.  According to the ALJ, the blueprints show that the 
distance between level B-1 and the ground was at least 25.5 feet. 
 He concluded that E & R erred in its reading of the blueprints, 
which it read as showing a distance of only 24 feet, because it 
failed to account for a 1.5 foot section of the structure. 
  In addition to the blueprints, the ALJ had the benefit 
of testimony of three witnesses on the matter of the fall 
distance.  Boyd, the OSHA compliance officer, testified that the 
distance was approximately 33 feet, because the area over which 
the ironworkers were working at the time of the violation had 
been dug out to create a loading dock.  He testified that he 
studied the engineer's drawings at the construction site and 
calculated the fall distance to be 29 feet.  He then added four 
additional feet to the fall hazard to account for the area which 
had been excavated to construct a loading dock.  He concluded 
that this was a fall distance of 33 feet. 
  Grossi agreed that the fall distance would have been 
approximately 29 feet, but testified that there was a soil 
overburden at the corner where the violation allegedly occurred. 
 He testified that soil overburden would be five feet high, which 
would leave only a 24 foot fall.  Grossi later testified that he 
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himself had never been to the job site, having only viewed it as 
he drove past it on the way to an area country club. 
  A project manager for the architects, Michael 
Spadafora, supported Boyd's testimony at the hearing.  Spadafora 
testified, using the blueprints and the videotape of the scene, 
that the area in question had not been backfilled at the time the 
videotape was shot.  He testified that the fall distance would 
therefore have been at least 29 feet at the time of the alleged 
violation. 
  Based upon the foregoing, the ALJ had substantial 
evidence in the record to determine that the fall distance was at 
least 25 feet at the time of the alleged violation.  The ALJ had 
the blueprints and the testimony of two witnesses that the fall 
distance was greater than 25 feet.  The only evidence to the 
contrary was the testimony of Grossi, which the ALJ found not 
credible.  There was substantial evidence on the record to 
support the ALJ's finding that the fall hazard confronting the 
ironworkers was greater than 25 feet. 
 
 C. 
  E & R further asserts that the OSHA compliance officer 
"has the duty to bring all `greater hazard' defenses to the 
Supervisor's attention, and that no Citation shall be issued if 
the elements of an affirmative defense are present," citing 59 
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Fed. Reg. 40684-85 as support.  In fact, this section of the 
Federal Register actually states: 
 OSHA has long acknowledged that there may be 
circumstances at a particular workplace which 
would make it unreasonable for the Agency to 
pursue a citation.  In the enforcement 
context, OSHA has consistently placed the 
burden on the employer in question to 
establish any such circumstances as 
"affirmative defenses" to OSHA citations.  
The Agency has had considerable experience in 
evaluating employers' efforts to establish 
affirmative defenses (e.g., "impossibility" 
(sometimes also known as "infeasibility") and 
"greater hazard" defenses) to citations.  
Based on that experience, OSHA has developed 
Section V.E of the Field Operations Manual 
(FOM) to guide OSHA personnel in assessing 
those defenses. 
 . . . Under Section V.E.3.d, an OSHA compliance 
officer who becomes aware that an employer is 
raising an affirmative defense is directed to 
gather pertinent information and to bring any 
possible defenses to the attention of his or 
her supervisor.  That section further 
provides that a citation is not issued when 
OSHA determines that each and every element 
of an affirmative defense is present. 
Under these guidelines, the employer may have an affirmative 
defense to a charge of violating an OSHA standard that compliance 
was impossible or infeasible.  Bancker Constr. Corp. v. Reich, 31 
F.3d 32, 34 (2d Cir. 1994).  The burden of establishing an 
affirmative defense is on the employer, and every element of an 
affirmative defense must be established to preclude issuance of a 
citation.  A compliance officer is not obligated to prove the 
employer's case; rather, the compliance officer's only obligation 
is to gather pertinent information and bring it to the attention 
of his or her supervisor when he "becomes aware that an employer 
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is raising an affirmative defense."  59 Fed. Reg. at 40685 
(emphasis added).  The burden, however, is on the employer to 
establish the defense in the first place.  In this case, E & R's 
simple assertion in their brief that "[t]he elements were 
present" will not sustain this burden. 
  E & R raises both an impossibility defense and a 
greater hazard (infeasibility) defense on this appeal.  However, 
E & R has clearly failed to establish the elements of an 
impossibility defense before the ALJ or the compliance officer.  
To establish an impossibility defense, the employer must show: 
(1) that it would be impossible to comply with the standard's 
requirements or that it would have precluded performance of the 
work; and (2) that there were no alternative means of employee 
protection available.  59 Fed. Reg. 40684.  E & R failed to 
present any evidence to the compliance officer or the ALJ to 
establish that it was impossible to comply with the safety 
requirements; in fact, Grossi conceded that the use of lifelines 
was feasible as a means of fall protection.  He asserted, 
however, that this was an unsafe practice, arguing that it 
presented a "greater hazard" than the risk of a fall.  "Avoidance 
of a greater hazard is also an affirmative defense," Bancker 
Constr., 31 F.3d at 34, which the employer has the burden of 
proving. 
  Despite Grossi's assertions, E & R has also failed to 
establish a "greater hazard" defense.  In order to establish this 
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defense, an employer must establish that compliance with a 
standard would result in greater hazards to employees than non-
compliance, that there are no alternative means of employee 
protection available, and that a variance was unavailable or 
inappropriate.  59 Fed. Reg. 40684; Voegele Co. v. Occupational 
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 625 F.2d 1075, 1080 (3d Cir. 
1980).  All three elements must be shown to establish a greater 
hazard defense.  Voegele Co., 625 F.2d at 1081. 
  Grossi testified as to the risks presented by lifeline 
entanglement and the limited mobility for the ironworkers "tied 
off" in this manner.  Boyd, the compliance officer, testified 
that the use of lifelines was a feasible and safe means of fall 
protection if done properly.  Additionally, Boyd asserted that 
the workers could wear lifelines while installing safety nets, 
another means of complying with § 1926.105(a).  
  The ALJ determined, after listening to the evidence, 
that Grossi failed to establish that a "greater hazard" existed, 
excusing his noncompliance with § 1926.105(a).  The ALJ found 
lifelines could have been used during the installation of the 
columns, and also could have been used while installing safety 
nets.  The ALJ found that "E & R has not refuted the Secretary's 
prima facie case that a practical means of fall protection was 
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available."5  Therefore, the ALJ held that the greater hazard 
defense was not applicable in the present matter.   
  In fact, the burden is not on OSHA to prove that a 
practical means of fall protection is available; rather, the 
burden is on the employer to prove that one is not.  E & R failed 
to establish that compliance with the standard presented a 
greater safety risk than the 25-foot fall would have.  As noted 
above, E & R also failed to present evidence that no alternative 
means of protecting the ironworkers were available or that a 
variance would have been inappropriate in this case.  Thus, we 
hold that E & R has failed to satisfy the burden required of them 
to establish that compliance with the OSHA regulation constitutes 
a greater hazard that would excuse non-compliance with the 
regulation.  The ALJ's determination that there was no greater 
hazard defense to this violation is supported by substantial 
evidence on the record, and his legal conclusion is not arbitrary 
and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with the law on this matter.   
  Additionally, E & R argues that they cannot be cited 
under 29 C.F.R. § 1926.105(a) because OSHA imposed a moratorium 
on citations under Subpart R, dealing with fall protection in 
steel erections.  However, E & R was charged with violating 29 
                     
5.  Additionally, E & R failed to assert that an application for a variance would have been 
inappropriate in the present matter, nor did E & R establish that no other means of fall protection 
were available.  Therefore, E & R has failed to establish the greater hazard defense under the test 
set forth by this Court.  Voegele Co., 625 F.2d at 1080. 
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C.F.R. § 1926.105(a) [Subpart E] in December of 1994; the 
amendments moving this section into Subpart R were not effective 
until February 6, 1995.  Therefore, neither the amendments nor 
the moratorium on the enforcement of these amended regulations 
has an impact on this case.   
  OSHA committed no error in charging E & R with a 
violation of § 1926.105(a) under Subpart E, which governs 
"Personal Protective and Life Saving Equipment" for Construction. 
 This section applied to all construction work, including the 
steel erection industry, at the time the violations took place.  
See 59 Fed. Reg. 40724 ("The requirements of § 1926.105(a) . . . 
will continue to apply to steel erection of buildings until 
Subpart R is revised.")  Therefore, no bar precluded enforcement 
of this provision in the instant case and the citation charging E 
& R with violating this section will stand. 
 
 III. 
  For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for Review of 
the Order of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission 
will be denied.  Costs taxed against the petitioner. 
